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I want to start with five opening propositions, to set the context for a 
discussion of where we go from here.  
 
1. First, the gradual development of European institutions has been 
marked by a long succession of crises, several of which looked at the time to 
threaten the future of the entire structure, though in retrospect they can be 
seen as the mechanisms which forced reluctant governments to accept change.  
European integration first collapsed in 1953, with the French National 
Assembly’s rejection of the treaty to establish the European Defence 
Community.  It seemed close to collapse again, also as a result of French 
intransigence, in the Luxembourg ‘Empty Chair’ crisis of 1965-6.   At the 
depth of the budgetary crisis in 1981-3, American observers were writing off 
European integration as a failure – before Margaret Thatcher and Francois 
Mitterand came to a compromise in Fontainebleau in 1984.  The Danes voted 
down the Maastricht treaty, and the French only narrowly approved it.  So we 
should not be too rattled by the latest crisis; though we need to consider 
whether this crisis is more severe than its predecessors, and in what ways. 
 
2. Second, institutions exist to make and implement policies, not for 
themselves.  Jean Monnet, who had a decisive influence over the original 
design of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950-52, and then over 
Euratom and the European Economic Community in 1956-57, believed that 
institutions were key in encouraging those who worked through them to seek 
common solutions; but he was also quite clear that the institutions were only 
justified if they did successfully promote common solutions, satisfactory for 
all the participants. 
 
3. Third, the institutional structures and policy acquis of the European 
Union still reflect the assumptions and priorities of 50 years ago – before the 
majority of today’s European citizens were born.  They reflect, furthermore, 
the priorities of the six original members, above all of France and Germany.  
The European Parliament, for example, still holds its plenary sessions in 
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Strasbourg, a city which symbolises the century-long struggle between France 
and Germany and the post-1945 effort to reconcile these two former enemies.  
The Council of Ministers still meets in Luxembourg three months out of 12, 
the outcome of a compromise negotiated among the six member states when 
the three original communities were merged 40 years ago, to compensate 
Luxembourg for the loss of the Coal and Steel Community headquarters.  But 
the EU now has 25 member states, likely to extend to 27 within the next 2-3 
years, and past 30 within the next decade, as the states of south-east Europe 
follow each other into full membership.  Reluctant adjustment of the original 
model to accommodate some of the interests of the new members may not be 
enough; institutional change should arguably have started from a recognition 
of how fundamentally the end of the cold war, the unification of Germany and 
the re-emergence of the states of central and eastern Europe from behind the 
Iron Curtain had transformed the context for European integration. 
 
4. Fourth, it was a huge and vainglorious mistake to label this relatively 
modest adjustment to the existing treaties a ‘Constitution’.  It was, after all, 
the fifth adjustment to Europe’s institutional arrangements in less than 20 
years – following the Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht treaty of 
European Union of 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, and the Treaty of 
Nice of 2002.  It was in many ways less innovative than the Maastricht Treaty 
in institutional and policy reforms.  The flummery of the Convention 
promised much more than it could ever deliver.  This long, detailed, three-part 
treaty was not what the EU Heads of Government had asked for in the Laeken 
declaration of December 2002; they had called for a short, easily-understood 
document, which Europe’s citizens could read and grasp.  The gap between 
the high-flown title and rhetoric, and the lengthy, almost unreadable document 
that the Convention produced, contributed to the confused responses of the 
European electorate. 
 
5. Fifth, the Convention did not deliver a Constitutional Treaty that 
addressed the needs of the EU-25, or today’s policy priorities – or the tasks 
set out for it by the European Council that set it up.  I share the view of Gisela 
Stuart, MP (one of the British representatives on the Convention and a 
member of its Presidium), that the Convention was captured by those who see 
the EU from Brussels out rather than from member states in; that these ‘Old 
Believers’ saw their task as defending the established institutions, and the 
established acquis, pursuing the old ‘European Project’ rather than defining a 
new one.  Their failure to produce a short document was symptomatic of this; 
Part Three was included to entrench the existing acquis, rather than accepting 
that much of its contents were legislative rather than constitutional and 
therefore open to continuing adjustment.  They failed to address the size, and 
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ineffectiveness, of the college of Commissioners.  They resisted a stronger 
subsidiarity clause, and watered down proposals to give national parliaments a 
stronger role in policing new proposals on subsidiarity grounds.  This was, at 
best, a curate’s egg of a treaty. 
Most responsible people, even in Brussels, now accept that the 
Constitutional Treaty as it stands is dead.  The French Government has 
effectively pronounced it dead, by stating that it can see no way of 
resubmitting to the French people in a referendum.  The questions we need to 
address, therefore, include: can we manage without a further treaty change for 
the foreseeable future; how much can we rescue from this failed attempt, or 
do we have to start again, with yet another Inter-governmental Conference, 
perhaps preceded by another Convention? 
 
HOW SEVERE A SETBACK IS THIS? 
 
I spent three days in Brussels last week.   The European Parliament is still 
meeting, with Commission officials giving evidence to committees and 
national officials from the permanent representations keeping watch. The 
Chemicals Directive is under active negotiation, with lobbyists swarming in 
the corridors; the Services Directive is still vigorously debated. The 
‘European Quarter’ of Brussels, which I remember from 40 years ago as a 
pleasant jumble of streets and 19th century houses, is still expanding, with 
building workers erecting yet more grandiose buildings. The British 
Presidency is busily preparing for an informal European Council, to discuss 
broader issues of European priorities, at Hampton Court at the end of this 
month, with officials travelling around European capitals for preparatory 
consultations.  At the formal European Council in December there will no 
doubt be a major Franco-British row, at least one late-night session, and 
eventual agreement on some limited steps forward – perhaps even on the next 
EU budget package. 
We should never underestimate the degree of inertia in the system.  
However, while some commentators have talked about institutional paralysis, 
cooperation continues to move forward in many fields.  While the Stability 
and Growth Pact, written on German insistence into the 1992 Maastricht 
treaty, has been shaken by the delinquent behaviour of the Italian, French and 
German governments, other fields of European integration have moved 
forward remarkably, and often almost unobserved.  Because the institutions 
are there, with recognised procedures for convening meetings and 
implementing their conclusions, governments tend to turn to them when new 
problems arise that cannot be dealt with without close cooperation.  Six years 
ago, for example, the European Union had nothing to do with defence.  Today 
the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, and their 
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staff within the Council Secretariat are responsible for the political 
stabilization and reconstruction of Bosnia, for related operations in Macedonia 
and Kosovo, and for various support operations in Africa.  Relations between 
this strengthened EU and a weakened NATO1 are a matter for active concern 
in Brussels and in national capitals. 
You will all be familiar with the even more remarkable transformation of 
cooperation in the field of ‘Justice and Home Affairs’2 – cooperation among 
law-enforcement agencies, prosecuting authorities, and courts – since the end 
of the cold war demolished Western Europe’s well-guarded eastern wall.  
Even as the Convention has been meeting, the European Arrest Warrant3 has 
been carried forward; Europol’s4 powers and staffing has grown; and 
Eurojust5 has got under way.  It was the perceived threats of transnational 
terrorism and organised crime that first pushed West European governments 
into cooperation in these fields, 25-30 years ago; the sharpening of these 
threats, evident to all in the past 4 years, has overridden national hesitations 
about legal integration, even about retaining and sharing personal data, with 
the British government in the lead in pushing others to abandon concerns 
about sovereignty and accept common rules. 
We might therefore argue that the EU is moving in the right direction, on 
a new agenda, without waiting for treaty reform.  Yes, agreement is still 
blocked on reform of the EU’s budgetary arrangements, and the gradual 
transformation of the Common Agricultural Policy is painfully slow in 
reducing its costs; but European governments are now developing common 
policies on fields which were completely taboo to those who negotiated the 
original treaties, and which are much more appropriate to the loose 
confederation that the EU has in effect become than the detailed regulations 
that the Commission continues to propose.  These more appropriate common 
policies, I repeat, are foreign policy, including security and defence, common 
management of external borders and of the rules covering those who cross 
them, confederal police arrangements, and gradual integration of legal 
procedures.  This does represent real progress, we should all recognise.  It is 
typical of the British press that a Commission proposal to criminalise 
environmental misbehaviour by companies received front-page treatment a 
few weeks ago, while the rapid return to Britain of a suspected terrorist 
arrested in Italy was in no way attributed to EU legislation; but you all know 
how significant the steps forward in extradition have been in recent years.  All 
of this suggests that the EU is not going to disintegrate; it’s a solid structure, 
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – www.nato.int/ 
2 www.mjha.gov.mt/departments/departments.html 
3 13th June 2002 - www.eurowarrant.net/ 
4 European Policy Office – www.europol.europa.eu/ 
5 Fight against serious organised crime – www.eurojust.europa.eu/ 
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that serves the interests of its member governments well in an expanding 
number of fields. 
 
THE CHARACTER OF THIS POLITICAL CRISIS 
 
Alongside this, however, there are some worrying aspects of the current 
crisis that do suggest that we may face a more severe situation than in 
previous crisis years.  First, the crisis in confidence in the EU institutions, and 
the willingness to implement EU decisions, is deepest in what used to be 
described as ‘core Europe’: the major states of the original EEC-6, Italy, 
France and Germany.  In some ways the crisis within Italy may, indeed, 
present a more fundamental challenge to the EU than the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty.  Here is a state which is part of the Eurozone, whose 
labour costs have worsened by 20% against Germany in the past 4-5 years; 
with a government that appears incapable of addressing necessary economic 
reforms; with strong elements of patronage and corruption, compounded by 
government attacks on the judiciary when these are investigated; which has 
resisted the implementation of EU rules in many fields, over many years; with 
a weak opposition, which seems unlikely to transform the situation if it wins 
the next election.  The EU has operated for nearly 50 years on the basis that 
member governments accepted and implemented Community law, even if 
under protest.  What happens if one major member state ceases to give 
priority to common rules and common interests in key areas of national 
economic policy?  How would the EU collectively, and the Eurozone in 
particular, respond to a structural political-economic crisis in Italy? 
The situation in France is much less severe; though it is fair to say that 
there is a crisis of confidence within the French political class.  One of my 
friends in Paris told me, in the wake of the Referendum result and the award 
of the Olympics to London, that he now understood what the mood in Paris 
must have been like in June 1940, in terms of lost direction and hopelessness 
about future alternatives – an exaggeration, I hope, but an indication of how 
badly the Parisian elite had misjudged their public.  French politics is blocked 
for another two years, until President Chirac, the dinosaur of European 
politics, retires.  Given the widespread mood of resistance to globalization, 
however, both within the public and the official elite, and the increasing 
identification of the EU-25 and its supposed ‘Anglo-Saxon’ majority with the 
threat of globalization, it’s not clear that President Chirac’s successor will be 
able to transform French policy.  But at least the French economy is 
fundamentally stronger than Italy’s, and the generation who believed that 
Europe could only be Europe if France led it is getting older. 
There was a hope that the blocked processes of socio-economic reform 
within Germany would be unblocked by a decisive outcome to last month’s 
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federal elections.  That has not happened.  It was too simple, in any event, to 
hope that a change of government could transform a political mood that has 
much deeper roots, let alone sweep away the complicated obstacles to change 
within Germany’s federal and corporatist structure.  The German public, like 
the French, are deeply ambivalent about globalization as a free market project 
– as it seems to them.  Their social market model is not a complete failure, in 
spite of what Anglo-Saxon economists are tempted to argue; the German 
economy has maintained a far higher level of advanced manufacturing than 
Britain, Germany is the world’s third largest exporter, and exports far more to 
China in particular than does Britain.  But a declining and ageing population, 
compounded by continuing long-term unemployment in the former east 
Germany, a rising federal budget deficit, and deep unease about eastern 
enlargement, have left German political leaders with little sympathy for a new 
European agenda.  Joschka Fischer6 summed up his country’s mood of 
uncertainty in a speech in London last July: ‘in 1989’, he said, ‘Europe’s back 
wall fell off, and we still do not know what to put in its place.’ 
The disregard that all three of these governments have displayed towards 
the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact also presents a worrying challenge 
to the supremacy of Community law.  Large states, like small, must obey 
common rules; otherwise the system begins to disintegrate.  The argument 
that the Dutch had to follow the rules, but that their larger neighbours could 
trample over them, was wielded by opponents of ratification in the Dutch 
Referendum. 
More widely than this, however, the negative votes in these two 
referendums have exposed the loss of confidence of European publics in their 
political elites.  European integration, after all, was, from the outset, an elite 
project.  Governments assigned authority to technocrats in Brussels, with 
committees of national officials to monitor them; so long as their negotiations 
delivered faster economic growth, the promoters of the EEC believed, 
Europe’s citizens would grant their ‘passive consent’ to what had been agreed.  
Such a model could work in the 1950s and 1960s, in European societies where 
mass parties, churches, trade unions and professional associations provided 
legitimising links between mass publics and political elites.  But it does not 
work in the anxious and ageing European societies of today, where challenges 
to national identity are posed by rapid economic change, the impact of 
globalization and multinational companies, and rising immigration.  This was 
the clearest lesson of the Dutch referendum, the first to be held there since 
1815.  An uncertain political class presented the old arguments for European 
6 German foreign minister and vice chancellor in the Government of Gerhard 
Schröder 1998 – 2005. 
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integration to their electorate, and received a resounding vote of no 
confidence, as strongly from the younger generation as from the old.   
Across the whole of Western Europe, there is a mistrust of political 
leaders of the conventional type, a decline in party loyalty and membership, 
even a degree of disillusion with democratic politics.  The Convention, with 
an ex-President of France who was 76 when it started, and former prime 
ministers from Belgium and Italy as its vice-chairs, looked like a conspiracy 
of elites to distrustful publics, rather than a gathering of the wise. That 
disillusionment with conventional styles of leadership makes the task of 
setting a new agenda for the EU much more difficult.  The Commission, the 
ultimate technocratic elite institution, no longer has the legitimacy to define a 
common agenda; but the political systems of the major member countries no 
longer recruit and promote the sort of leaders who are willing to take short-
term risks to attain long-term gains, and who can persuade their electorates to 
follow them. 
 
THE OPPORTUNITIES THIS CRISIS OFFERS 
 
So far I have said very little about the Constitutional Treaty and what we 
should do next about treaty reform.  That is, I repeat, because I believe that 
constitutional structures can only go some way to correct underlying political, 
social and economic weaknesses, and that institutions should be designed to 
promote preferred policy outcomes, not – as in effect happened within the 
Convention – with only passing reference to the policies they serve.  It’s also 
because I consider part of the problem with the Convention and the text that it 
produced requires more fundamental criticism.  The Convention failed to 
question the underlying assumptions of the original model of West European 
integration: a model which, as Giandomenico Majone has argued in his 
excellent new book, Dilemmas of European Integration, was build to promote 
‘Integration by stealth’, with a European federation as the eventual (but 
undeclared) objective, and the European Commission – and the European 
Court of Justice – as its driving forces.  Little by little, authority over fields of 
domestic policy would be transferred to Brussels, in a gradual but one-way 
process, slowly transforming the Commission into the effective European 
government, to which national governments would have to defer.   
The refusal of European publics to support this transfer of authority has 
been evident for the past 20 years or more; but the dream has lingered on 
within Brussels, with wider support from some in Luxembourg, Rome, Paris 
and even Berlin.  President Giscard’s comparisons of the Convention’s task 
with that of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 suggested that he and others 
believed that the time was now ripe to transform the EU into a full federation 
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– even though what they produced was only the equivalent of a revision of the 
Articles of Confederation. 
It’s important to underline how liberating the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty has been for those of us who believe in the necessity of closer 
European cooperation, within a clear legal framework, but who wished to 
criticise the structure and operation of our current institutions and the policy 
Acquis that has accumulated over the past 50 years.  There were intense 
pressures not to criticise the Commission, for example, for those of us who 
regularly dealt with Brussels; to query the Commission’s role, or the Acquis, 
or even the balance of the common budget, was to risk dismissal as an Anglo-
Saxon, even a Eurosceptic.  The debate about supporting or opposing 
‘Europe’ was conducted, in Brussels as well as in many national media, in 
black and white terms, rather than in the shades of grey that ought to 
characterise democratic debate.  Many, like me, who were preparing to 
campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote in a British referendum, in support of a document 
about which we felt deeply ambivalent, now feel freed to debate the 
absurdities of the common budget, the failings of the established institutions, 
and the need to return some regulatory powers to national and sub-national 
governments.  The shock of the Referendum results has broken the old taboos. 
The rhetoric of pursuing the ‘European Project’, of calling for ‘ever closer 
union’ negotiated through successive revisions of the treaty has given rise to 
the reasonable suspicion that the aim for some players within the EU system 
is still to move, little by little, towards a European federation, without 
admitting that hidden objective.  I think that political elites would do much to 
regain the confidence of their publics if they stated clearly that a European 
federation is not a practical or desirable objective within the foreseeable 
future; but that what we have created over the past 50 years, and particularly 
over the past 20 years – since the Single European Act – is a Confederation, 
which has served the wishes of its member governments and publics to strike 
a balance between autonomy and integration relatively well.  We have an 
established system of federal law, and a widening range of common policies, 
negotiated among member governments.  This is not a unique political entity, 
as enthusiasts for the ‘Community Method’ have described it: it’s a 
recognisable Confederation.  The issue at stake then becomes how to make 
our confederation work more effectively, rather than how to erect a grand new 
edifice on top of it.  
 
A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION? 
 
Heads of Government agreed after the French and Dutch referendum 
results that they would now promote a ‘Period of Reflection’ before returning 
to discuss the future of the Constitutional Treaty.  So far, few of them have 
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reflected any of their thoughts in public. What, then, should they be reflecting 
on? 
One focus, as I have just suggested, should be on improving the 
effectiveness of the EU’s current institutions and their output.  One of the 
many factors in the mood of disillusion about the European Union, even 
among those who deal directly with these institutions, is that their 
performance and output is in many areas below the level we ought to expect.  
Of course, any multi-national institution suffers from structural inefficiencies 
compared to national administrations; there is a lower level of mutual trust, an 
unavoidable concern for national balance in appointments, promotions and 
policy decisions.  But the quality of the service that the EU Commission 
provides to many of its customers is unacceptably low.  As an academic I am 
conscious that DG Research,7 for example, has a settled tendency to send out 
requests for contracts with short deadlines, most often in July with a deadline 
for completion of a complex proposal by the end of August – a convenient 
timescale for Commission holidays, but the most unhelpful timescale for the 
academic community throughout the EU.  And I could cite similar examples 
from other Directorates-General.  
The Commission has imposed stringent standards on applicant countries, 
in terms of quality of administration, opportunities for women and ethnic 
minorities, and so on; but it does not fully observe all these standards itself. It 
is stuck with a 1960s template of staff consultations and unions; internal 
morale is poor.  It needs the respect of national administrations, multinational 
companies and other clients; the quality of its economic analysis, the 
timeliness of its proposals and reports, all need improvement.  More than this, 
the Commission needs a cultural change.  Its staff should not see itself as 
building Europe’s future government; they are providing an essential service 
for the European confederation.  They should not be working against national 
governments, in competition with the Council Secretariat; they are working 
with them in a collective exercise. Bureaucratic rivalry between different 
directorates-general belies the self-image of the Commission as a coherent 
body; it might be more efficient to hive some of the Commission’s functions 
off into separate Agencies, performing specific regulatory tasks. 
Implementation of EU policies and decisions has always been one of the 
weakest points of the EU policy process: neglected not only by the 
Commission and the European Parliament, but also by many national 
governments.  As you all know, the final sanction for non-implementation has 
been to take national governments to the ECJ8 – but that is a long and slow 
7 Directorate General responsible for science, research and development – European 
Commission – ec.europa.eu/research/ 
8 European Court of Justice – curia.europa.eu/ 
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process – undesirably slow.  There are some classic examples of non-
implementation: the French Government, for example, has never enforced the 
Common Fisheries Policy on its own fishermen, according to a French study; 
the Belgian Government is incapable of applying the Waste Water Directiveto 
the mosaic of Flemish and French-speaking communes that constitute greater 
Brussels – which means that new member countries are now struggling to 
meet environmental standards that do not operate in Europe’s institutional 
capital.   
I have been glad to hear Members of the European Parliament say, since 
the Referendums, that they intend to pay more attention in future to scrutiny 
of implementation.  The Commission ought to pay more attention to this, too; 
it has pursued fraud within the Common Agricultural Policy with increasing 
vigour, and the Internal Market Directorate-General has published league 
tables of national incorporation of directives, but the monitoring of 
implementation on the ground is beyond its legal competences.  I would like 
to suggest that we should spread across the entire field of common policies 
the innovation adopted within the inter-governmental Third Pillar, where 
mutual inspection of border controls and court procedures has developed 
through multinational teams from several member states inspecting national 
practice.  [I once met a happy British policeman who had just returned from 
several weeks inspecting Greek border controls, visiting one island after 
another.]  A confederation should make more use of such procedures, with far 
more exchange of officials between national and EU levels of administration 
and between different national administrations, on secondment. 
Lawyers contributing to this period of reflection might also like to offer 
proposals on how to improve the delivery of Community law.  As you all 
know, the caseloads of the ECJ and the Court of First Instance have 
mushroomed in recent years; by 40% for the ECJ in the 1990s, with the recent 
enlargement likely to increase the flow further.  Delays have grown with the 
caseloads.  The average wait for a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice in 2004 was 23.5 months, with 840 cases still pending at the end of the 
year.  The legal profession across the EU might usefully consider collectively 
how best to handle this bottleneck. 
The Convention was deeply ambivalent about the issue of subsidiarity – 
another important focus for reflection now that the referendums have blocked 
the treaty they proposed.  The recent proposals by Commission President 
Barrroso and Commissioner Verheugen to withdraw some 70 legislative 
proposals is an important signal that the Commission understands that piling 
regulation on regulation is not the way forward – nor the way to regain the 
consent of European electorates.  But, I suggest, the Commission, and 
member governments, need to go further, in reversing the flow of detailed 
regulations upwards.  Of course it is extremely difficult to agree on what 
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fields of policy should be dealt with at what level: battles over state’s rights 
and federal pre-emption are staples of federal politics within the USA, as well 
as in the weaker federations of Canada and Australia.  The United Kingdom 
has been no better than others in pressing its particular concerns on the EU; 
the antis in the Dutch referendum campaign made great play with the Zoo 
Directive, a piece of legislation pressed forward by the British animal welfare 
lobby.  I recall a Lords enquiry on a Commission proposal to standardise 
permitted alcohol levels in blood for drivers throughout the EU – for a 
Community which has remarkably diverse attitudes to driving and to the 
enforcement of driving regulations. One simple test of appropriateness might 
be that any regulation and directive that has transferred authority to Brussels 
that within the federal United States remains with the component states should 
be open to challenge. 
The Constitutional Treaty did offer national parliaments a slightly 
stronger role in policing new proposals for their appropriateness in our diverse 
EU-25.  But there’s no need to wait for treaty change before national 
parliaments change their habits, and improve their cooperation.  Almost all 
national parliaments now have liaison offices in Brussels – a major 
development, almost unobserved, within the past five years; better-organised 
scrutiny committees, working more closely together, would establish the 
political influence to block unnecessary proposals that the Treaty has offered. 
We also need a public debate – not just an occasional reflection among 
heads of government – about policy priorities for a European Union which 
now has 25 members, and will shortly expand further to 27-8.  Here the 
British government is as badly at fault as any of its partners.  Our Prime 
Minister has been virtually silent on EU priorities since his excellent speech to 
the European Parliament in June.  British ministers find it hard to resist the 
temptation to preach at their continental colleagues, thus feeding harmful 
stereotypes about Anglo-Saxon liberalism destroying Europe’s social model.  
We need political leaders to discuss constructively the difficult compromises 
we are all attempting to strike between economic innovation and social 
solidarity, between ageing populations and resistance to immigration, between 
rising pressures on public expenditure and popular resistance to high taxation.  
The Lisbon Agenda on European economic reform has run into the sand 
partly because those who promoted this new agenda – the British among the 
leaders – have failed to make their case persuasively to the publics of other 
states. 
We have a similar problem with public debate over common foreign 
policy – an area in which there is clear added value in member states working 
more closely together.  It was the British government, together with the 
French, that launched the proposal for European cooperation in defence, in 
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1998; now that the process is moving ahead, British ministers are silent, 
apparently for fear of attack in our Eurosceptic domestic press. 
A focus on developing policies in fields where there is a clear advantage 
to be won from common action – and funding policies where there is a clear 
European public good – would lead the EU to a stronger emphasis on foreign 
policy, and on relations with its eastern and southern neighbours.  It would 
also strengthen awareness of the value of common policies on policing, 
immigration, and justice, areas largely unreported or recognised in the media.  
And it would focus more, I suggest, on environmental issues, and on the 
whole sustainability agenda, which is likely to become a more and more 
central issue in domestic and international politics in future years.  This is also 
an area which would help the distant institutions of the EU to reconnect with 
the younger generation of European citizens. 
And, of course, political leaders must address the thorny issue of further 
EU enlargement, which is another area in which national publics suspect 
governments of failing to take their preferences into account.  This is a subject 
for another lecture – though an immensely important and complex issue.  I 
will just say here that the British Government has throughout been one of the 
main sponsors of Turkish accession, but – again – has done little to make the 
strategic and cultural case for that accession to publics either within Britain or 
elsewhere within the EU. 
 
 BUT WHAT ABOUT THE TREATY? 
 
If governments press ahead with the non-treaty reforms I have suggested, 
and engage in the debate about policy priorities which was absent from the 
Convention and its procedures, can we then manage without further treaty 
reform?  The case that was argued for the Convention and Constitutional 
Treaty was, in part, that EU decision-making would break down under the 
strain of 25 member states.  So far, however, the EU has continued to operate 
at 25 without breakdown, although suffering the unavoidable lengthening of 
meetings in which 25 representatives in succession wish to have their say. 
I want to suggest that there remains a limited, but necessary, agenda for 
constitutional reform, which can be accommodated by the resubmission for 
ratification of Part 1 of the Constitutional Treaty, most probably – here I bow 
to more expert legal opinion – with Part 2, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
also attached.  Thankfully, even members of the Convention now accept that 
it was a mistake to incorporate Part 3, almost unexamined, into the Treaty.  
The most important elements should include the adjustment to the voting rules 
that the Nice treaty failed to agree; the strengthening of the EU’s external 
policy capacities provided for in the creation of the post of EU foreign 
minister and of a joint EU External Action Service; and changes in the 
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Council, including moving from the current rotating presidency to longer-term 
team presidencies.  I have mixed views about the desirability of a new 
President of the European Council, which risks building competition among 
senior appointees into the structure of the EU.   I regret that the Convention 
only took such a small step towards limiting the size of the Commission – 
now 25 Commissioners, one from each member state.  I strongly support the 
French proposal for a College of 11-13 members, chosen from a short list 
submitted by member governments: that would produce a far more effective 
body.  But the tensions and suspicions between the larger and smaller states 
blocked agreement on this so far.  We should note, in passing, that the balance 
between large and small component states is a structural issue in any 
federation or confederation, and that the Constitutional Treaty as it stood did 
not address the underlying balance to be struck. 
If political leaders within the EU recover their confidence and their ability 
to address issues in Europe-wide terms, we may anticipate that such a more 
limited revision of the treaties may prove acceptable to our suspicious 
electorates.  But it will require an honest and open debate, beforehand, about 
the EU’s strategic purposes and priorities, to prepare opinion for these 
desirable changes. Constitutions, after all, exist to serve agreed political 
objectives, within defined territories.  They do not exist for themselves.  
